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1. Introduction
The factors that influence the decision to merge by private firms and the  effects  of  that
decision on social welfare have been analyzed by the literature on mergers. For example, Farrell
and Shapiro (1990) show that, under cost asymmetries, mergers by private firms can increase
social welfare. This is the case when the losses caused by the reduction in market competition
are outweighed by the cost savings obtained by transferring the output from less efficient plants
to more efficient ones. From the point of view of private firms, strategic mergers entail, among
other  benefits,  market  power  increases  and  cost  reductions  derived  from  management,
production, financing and distribution economies (see, for example, Mueller, 1980).
The literature on mergers has extensively analyzed the decision to merge by private firms but
it has not considered the decision to merge by private and public firms. The purpose of this
paper is to fill this gap in literature.
1  It must be noted that the literature on public firms usually
assumes that private firms maximize profits, public firms maximize social welfare and firms
with a mixture of private and public ownership maximize the weighted average of the payoff of
the government and their own profit.
2 Therefore, when considering the decision to merge by
private and public firms it must be taken into account that these firms have different objective
functions.
The above issue is important because of the recent debates concerning the privatization of
public  firms.  Public  firms  are  usually  acquired  by  private  firms,  which  reorganize  their
organizational structure by setting up multiproduct firms after the acquisition. However, the
literature on public firms considers that when a public firm is privatized a  new  uniproduct
private firm arises. In this framework, De  Fraja and Delbono (1989) show that when firms
                                                
1  In this paper we will consider as a merger those cases in which one firm acquires another firm.
2 Matsumura (1998) argues that with the exception of the USA, we can observe many firms with a mixture of
private and public ownership. He shows that this type of firm is a reasonable choice for the government in the
context of a mixed duopoly with uniproduct firms.3
produce a homogeneous good and the number of private firms is high enough, it is socially
desirable to privatize the public firm.
In this paper we assume that when a private firm and a public firm merge, they set up a
multiproduct firm. The new firm will be neither public nor private, and the government will
own an exogenous percentage of the shares in the multiproduct firm. We consider that the
private firm and the public firm produced heterogeneous products and that, after merging, the
multiproduct firm has two divisions, producing one variety in each division.
3 We show that the
decision to merge by a private firm and a public firm crucially depends on the degree to which
goods are substitutes and on the percentage of the shares that the government owns in the
multiproduct firm.
One example of the question that we want to study is given by the acquisition of SEAT, a
Spanish  publicly  owned  automobile  manufacturer,  by  Volkswagen  in  1986.  After  the
acquisition, Volkswagen continued producing cars with both brands. Volkswagen is partially
owned by the government of Lower Saxony, which owns a 20 percent stake in the firm (Esser,
1998).
Similarly, the French firm Renault acquired a 36.8% equity stake in Nissan Motor and a
22.5% stake in Nissan Diesel (Renault Presse, 20-10-99) in 1999. Renault was privatized in
1996, and its share capital is owned 55.8% by private shareholders and 44.2% by the French
State. Recently, “Renault and the Romanian State Ownership Fund have just carried out the
planned transfer of capital and shares, thus sealing the agreement signed on July 2,  1999.
Renault  has  acquired  51%  of  the  equity  capital  of  Dacia  ...  Dacia,  now  a  private-sector
company, thus becomes a second marque for the Renault group” (Renault Presse, 30-9-99).
                                                
3 Though product homogeneity is convenient as a first approximation, empirical evidence shows that most real
world markets are characterized by product  differentiation.  Thus, Cremer  et al.  (1991)  argue  that introducing
heterogeneous products is a significant step towards achieving a better understanding of actual mixed oligopolies.4
We consider a duopoly in which one of the two firms is public and the other private (a
mixed duopoly). We study whether the public firm and the private one want to merge to set up
a multiproduct firm in which the government owns an exogenous percentage of the shares. We
show that when the percentage of the shares owned by the government in the multiproduct firm
takes an intermediate value and the degree to which goods are substitutes is low enough, both
the private firm and the public firm will want to merge. When the percentage of the shares
owned by the government takes an intermediate value  and  the  degree  to  which  goods  are
substitutes is high enough, neither the private firm nor the public firm will want to merge. We
also show that when the multiproduct firm is able to obtain economies of scope, the private
firm and the public firm want to merge for a broader range of the values of the percentage of the
shares owned by the government and the degree to which goods are substitutes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the model. Section three studies
the results. Section four analyzes the decision to merge by firms when there are no economies
of scope. Section five analyzes the decision to merge by firms when there are economies of
scope, and conclusions are drawn in section six.
2. The model
To study the decision to merge by a public firm and a private one, we consider an economy
made up of a monopolistic sector and a competitive numeraire one. The monopolistic sector
comprises two firms producing a differentiated good: one firm is public and the other firm is
private, denoted by 0 and 1, respectively.
4 On the consumption side, there is a continuum of
consumers of the same type whose utility function is linear and separable in the numeraire
                                                
4 Bös (1986, p.231) points out that when public and private firms exist in the economy, “Partial analysis must
be centered on duopolistic or oligopolistic structures where one of the participants is a public enterprise.  The
great advantage of such an analysis is that it reveals the whole range of possible outcomes as depending on the
different possible reactions of the economic agents considered”.5
good. The representative consumer maximizes U(q0,  q1)  -  p0q0  -  p1q1,  where  qi³0  is  the
amount of the good i and pi is its price (i = 0, 1). The function U(q0, q1) is assumed to be
quadratic, strictly concave and symmetric in q0 and q1:




2 + 2bq0q1 + q0
2), 1>b³0,
5
where parameter b measures the degree to which goods are substitutes. Then, inverse demand
functions are given by:
pi = a– qi – b qj,   i ¹ j;  i, j = 0, 1.
As is usually assumed (see, for example, De  Fraja  and  Delbono,  1989),  firms  have
identical technologies, represented by the quadratic cost function:
    C(qi) = F + 1
2 kqi
2, k³ 1.5, i = 0, 1,
6
(1)
where F=0 with no loss of generality, since entry decisions are not considered. The profit
function of firm i is given by:
    pi = qi (a – qi – bqj) – 1
2 kqi
2, i ¹ j; i, j =0, 1. (2)
                                                
5 We consider a simplified version of the model used by Vives (1984). Following Vives, we assume that b<1 to
assure that the function U(q0, q1) is strictly concave.
6 To eliminate non relevant cases we consider that parameter k is high enough, that is, k³1.5.6
The private firm chooses the output level, q1, that maximizes its profit given by (2) for i=1
and j=0. The public firm chooses the output level, q0,  that  maximizes  social  welfare.  We
measure social welfare as  the  sum  of  consumer  surplus  (denoted  by  CS)  and  producers’
surplus. Therefore, social welfare is given by:
    W = CS + p0 + p1,  (3)
where consumer surplus is given by:
   CS= 1
2 (q0
2 + q1
2) + bq0q1.           
(4)
The public and the private firms can decide to merge and set up a multiproduct firm with two
divisions, 0 and 1.
7 If they merge, we assume that the government owns s percent of the shares
in the multiproduct firm. Following Matsumura (1998) we consider that a firm which is jointly
owned by the public and private sectors maximizes the weighted average of the payoff of the
government and its own profit. Therefore, in this case,  the  multiproduct  firm  chooses  the
output level of its two divisions, q0 and q1, that maximizes:
V = s W + (1-s) (p0+ p1),  (5)
where p0 and p1 are given by (2) and W is given by (3).
We propose a two stage game with the following timing. First, the private and public
firms decide whether to merge and set up a multiproduct firm whose ownership is shared by the
                                                
7 We do not consider that two independent private firms arise in case of privatization. De  Fraja and  Delbono
(1989)  show that the government  prefers  a mixed  duopoly  rather  than  two  private  firms  when  goods  are
homogenous. This result holds when goods are not perfect substitutes.7
private and the public sectors. Second, the uniproduct firms or the multiproduct  firm  make
production decisions. To obtain a subgame perfect equilibrium, the game is solved backwards.
3. Results
Given that firms have to decide whether to merge or not, we have two cases. First, the
public firm and the private one do not merge; in this case there is a mixed duopoly denoted by
the  superscript  G.  Second,  firms  merge  and  set  up  a  multiproduct  firm  in  which  the
government owns s percent of the shares; we denote this case by the superscript S.
We solve first the second stage of the game when there is a mixed duopoly. The private firm
chooses the value of q1 that maximizes (2), for i=1 and j=0. The public firm chooses the value
of q0 that maximizes (3). Solving these two problems simultaneously, we get:
   q0
G=
a (2 – b +k)
2 – b
2 + 3k + k
2 , q1
G=
a (1 – b +k)
2 – b
2 + 3k + k
2 ,
 
   p0
G=
a k(2 – b +k)
2 – b
2 + 3k + k
2 , p1
G=
a (1+k) (1 – b +k)
2 – b
2 + 3k + k
2 ,
   
p0
G= a2 k (2 – b +k)2
2 (2 – b2 + 3k + k2)
2 , p1
G= a2 (2 + k) (1 – b +k)2






2 (7 + 2 b
3 + 15k + 10k
2+2k
3 –2b
2(1 + k) – 2b (3 +4k + k
2))
2 (2 – b
2 + 3k + k
2)
2 .
It is easy to see that the output of the public firm is greater than that of the private one
independently of the degree to which goods are substitutes. Thus, in equilibrium, the public
firm has higher marginal and total costs than the private one. Social welfare strictly decreases8
with parameter b, since  the  industry’s  output  (and  thus  the  consumer  surplus)  and  profit
decrease also with this parameter.
8
When the two firms merge, they set up a multiproduct firm that chooses the values of q0 and
q1 that maximize (5). Thus, we get:




(2 – s) (1 + b) + k
,
   p0
S = p1
S =
a ((1 – s) (1 + b) + k)
(2 – s) (1 + b) + k
,
    pS= a2(2(1 – s) (1 + b) + k)
((2 – s) (1 + b) + k)2 ,    WS = a2 ((3 – 2s) (1 + b) + k)
((2 – s) (1 + b) + k)2 ,
where     pSis the total profit of the multiproduct firm. The social welfare and the output of the
industry increase with parameter s while the profit of the multiproduct firm decreases with this
parameter. The reason is that the greater the value of parameter s is, the greater the weight of
social welfare is in the objective function of the multiproduct firm. As a result, when parameter
s increases, the output level of the two divisions and the consumer surplus increase, which
outweighs the decrease in the profit of the multiproduct firm.
The multiproduct firm internalizes that divisions 0 and 1 produce substitute goods. Thus, as
competition between the divisions increases with the degree to which goods are substitutes, the
greater parameter b is, the lower the output level of the two divisions and the consumer surplus
are. Therefore, the output of industry, the profit of the multiproduct firm and social welfare
decrease with parameter b.
                                                
8 It can be shown that the output of both firms decreases with parameter b. The inverse demand function of good
i is given by pi = a– qi – b qj; therefore, for a given qj, if b increases a-bqj decreases and, thus, the market size of
good i also decreases. As a result, qi decreases if b increases.9
4. Analysis of the decision by firms to merge
In order to analyze the decision by firms to merge it must be pointed out that the objective
functions of the firms (see (2), (3) and (5)) are influenced, in a different way, by parameters b
and s. Thus, we can identify two effects, the s-effect and the b-effect, which we  describe
below.
The s-effect only affects the multiproduct firm. When parameter s increases, for a given
value of parameter b, the weight of social welfare in the objective function of the multiproduct
firm is greater and, thus, output level, consumer surplus and social welfare increase, while
profit decreases.
The second effect is the b-effect: for a given value of parameter s, the greater the degree to
which goods are substitutes is, the lower the firms’ output level is. This effect is made up of
two further effects. On the one hand, when parameter b increases, the market size of each
good, and thus the output level, decreases. On the other hand, when parameter b increases, the
multiproduct firm and the public one internalize that goods are substitutes (thus reducing their
output level). Both effects influence output level in the same way and thus, for a given value of
parameter s, when parameter b increases the private firm reduces its output level less than the
multiproduct firm and the public one.
We shall now analyze whether firms want to merge and set up a multiproduct firm. First we
consider whether the private firm wants to merge or not. In case of merging the private firm
will own 1-s percent of the shares in the multiproduct firm. Therefore,  the  owners  of  the
private firm will accept the merger if the profit that they will obtain in the multiproduct firm, (1-
s)pS, is greater than the profit obtained by the private firm in the mixed duopoly,      p1
G. Let sP
denote the value of parameter  s  such  as  (1-s)pS=     p1
G;  this  value,  shown  in  the  appendix,
increases with parameter b.10
Proposition 1. (1-s)pS>     p1
G if and only if s< sP, where 0<sP<1.
This proposition shows that the private firm will want to merge with the public firm if,
after the merger, the shareholders of the private firm own a high enough percentage of the
shares in the multiproduct firm (i. e., if s<sP).
9 When s is high enough (i. e., if s³sP) the
private firm would prefer not to merge. This result is shown in figure 1 for a given value of
parameter k. This figure show how the decision on merging by the private firm depends on







The private firm does 
not want to merge
The private firm
 wants to merge
Figure 1. Illustration of proposition 1 for a given value of parameter k.
When parameter s is low or high enough, only the s-effect is important in explaining the
result. When parameter s is low enough, the shareholders of the private firm will always want
the merger since they will have a high enough percentage of the shares in the multiproduct firm.
                                                
9 It is easy to see that, for the values of parameter s at which the private firm wants to merge with the public
firm, the total profit of the industry is greater with a multiproduct firm than with a mixed duopoly.11
When parameter s is high enough, the result is reversed since they will have a low enough
percentage of the shares.
When parameter s takes an intermediate value, parameter b is important in explaining the
decision on merging  by  the  private  firm.  If  parameter  b  is  low  (high)  enough,  given  an
intermediate value of parameter s, the private firm does not want (wants) to merge. If b=0,
goods are independent in demand; as the private firm is a monopolist and does not take social
welfare into account, we have that (1-s)pS<     p1
G. If b tends to 1, the degree to which goods are
substitutes is high. Thus, the profit of the private firm is very low since the public firm is very
aggressive and competition in the product market is strong. On the other hand, the multiproduct
firm internalizes that the degree to which goods are substitutes is high, reducing the output of
the two goods to decrease market competition. As a result, (1-s)pS>     p1
G. Up till now we have
only considered two extreme cases (b=0 and b tends to 1); if we consider other values  of
parameter b, it must be noted that when b increases, for a given value of parameter s,      p1
G
decreases more than (1-s)pS. Thus, when b is low (high) enough, for an intermediate value of
parameter s,      p1
G
 is greater (lower) than (1-s)pS.
The  private  firm  is  indifferent  to  merging  for  s=sP,  and  this  value  increases  with
parameter b. To explain  this  result,  both  the  s-effect  and  the  b-effect  must  be  taken  into
account. The s-effect implies that (1-s)pS decreases with parameter s while      p1
G does not change
with this parameter. The b-effect implies that if parameter b decreases, for a given value of
parameter s,      p1
G increases more than (1-s)pS. As a result, if b decreases, it is necessary that the
shareholders of the private firm receive a higher percentage of the shares in the multiproduct
firm (i. e., parameter s must decrease) to be indifferent to merging.12
Now we are going to analyze whether the government prefers a multiproduct firm, in which
it owns s percent of the shares, to a mixed duopoly. The government prefers a multiproduct
firm to a mixed duopoly if WS>WG. Let sW denote the value of parameter s such that WS=WG;
this value, shown in the appendix, increases with parameter b.
Proposition 2. WS>WG  if and only if s>sW, where 0<sW<1.
This proposition shows that the government prefers a multiproduct firm to a mixed duopoly
only when it owns a high enough percentage of the shares in the multiproduct firm (i. e., if
s>sW). Proposition 2 is shown in figure 2 for a given value of parameter k. This figure shows
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The public firm does 
not want to merge
Figure 2. Illustration of proposition 2 for a given value of parameter k.
As in the preceding case, when parameter s is low or high enough, only the s-effect is
important in explaining the decision by the government on merging. When parameter s is high
enough, the public firm will always want to merge, since the government will have a high
enough percentage of the shares in the multiproduct firm. When parameter s is low enough, the
result is reversed, since the percentage of the shares owned by the government is low enough.13
When parameter s takes an intermediate value, parameter b is important in explaining the
decision  by  the  government  on  merging.  If  parameter  b  is  high  (low)  enough,  given  an
intermediate value of parameter s, the public firm does not want (wants) to merge. If b=0,
goods are independent in demand. The private firm is a monopolist and does not take social
welfare into account. As the public firm cannot influence the market served by the private firm,
the government prefers a multiproduct firm to a mixed duopoly. If b tends to 1, the degree to
which goods are substitutes is high. Thus, social welfare is high in the case of a mixed duopoly
since the public firm is very aggressive and competition in product market is strong; as a result,
the government prefers a mixed duopoly to a multiproduct firm. If we consider other values of
parameter b, it must be noted that when b increases, for a given value of  parameter s, WS
decreases more than WG. Thus, when b is high (low) enough, for an intermediate value of
parameter s, the public firm does not want (wants) to merge.
The public firm is indifferent to merging for s=sW, and this value increases with parameter
b. To explain this result, both the s-effect and the b-effect must be taken into account. The s-
effect  implies  that  WS  increases  with  parameter  s  while  WG  does  not  change  with  this
parameter. The b-effect implies that if parameter b increases, for a given value of parameter s,
WS decreases more than WG. As a result, if b increases, the government must obtain a higher
percentage of the shares in the multiproduct firm to be indifferent to allowing the merger.
In order to determine the equilibrium of the game (i. e., whether the private and public
firms merge or not) we have to compare the values sP and sW. Given that this comparison is
very complex, we shall compare sP and sW for a given value of parameter k.
Lemma 1. For k=2, sW³sP  if and only if b³b*=0.4432.14
This lemma shows that sW is lower than sP for low enough values of parameter b, while
the result is reversed for high enough values of parameter b. The result obtained in lemma 1
holds for all k, as shown in figure 3; this figure  shows that b* decreases with parameter k.
b
k s     =   s
W P
s    >   s
W P s     <   s
W P
Figure 3. Comparison of sP and sW.
Taking into account lemma 1 and propositions 1 and 2, we have the following result.
Proposition 3. For k=2, the private firm and the public firm will merge when b<b* and
sW<s <sP.
10
This proposition shows that the private firm and the public one want to merge, setting up
a multiproduct firm, for sW<s<sP.  This  is  the  case  when  the  degree  to  which  goods  are
substitutes is low enough (b<b*). From lemma 1 and propositions 1 and 2 we can illustrate
proposition 3 in figure 4.
                                                













Figure 4. Illustration of proposition 3.
In figure 4 we can distinguish four zones. In zone I, both the private firm and the public
one prefer to merge. In zone II, the private firm wants to merge but the government prefers a
mixed duopoly. In zone III, neither the private firm nor the public firm want to merge. Finally,
in zone IV the government prefers a multiproduct firm but the private firm does not want to
merge. The results shown in zones I to IV in figure 4 are explained by the interaction of the s-
effect and the b-effect. In order to explain these results we will assume first that parameter b is
given  and  only  parameter  s  can  change.  Subsequently  we  will  also  change  the  value  of
parameter b.
We shall assume firstly that b=0 and only parameter s can change (see table 1); thus, the
results obtained are due to the s-effect only. In this case, we will analyze whether the public
firm and the private one want to merge or not. As we have seen, the government allows the
merger if WS>WG, whereas the private firm wants to merge if (1-s)pS>     p1
G.
When s=0, WG>WS, since the multiproduct firm is private whereas there is a public firm in
the mixed duopoly. When parameter s increases, the weight of social welfare in the objective16
function of the multiproduct firm is higher and, as a result, WS increases. Given that WG does
not depend on parameter s, if this parameter is high enough (i. e., if s>0.3557=sW(b=0)), WS
will be greater than WG and the government will prefer a multiproduct firm. However, when
s<sW(b=0) the government will prefer a mixed duopoly.


















































Table 1. Values of the objective functions of the government and the private firm for k=2.
When  s=0,  the  private  firm  wants  to  merge,  since  it  will  own  all  the  shares  in  the
multiproduct firm. When parameter s increases, the  s-effect  implies  that  (1-s)pS  decreases
while      p1
G does not change. Then, if parameter s is high enough (i. e., if s³0.4900=sP(b=0)),
the private firm will not want to merge.
The reason why sP(b=0) is greater than sW(b=0) is the following. When s=0, the difference
between      p1
G and (1-s)pS is great, and therefore parameter s has to increase a great deal in order
for      p1
G to be equal to (1-s)pS. However, the difference between WG and WS is small, and
therefore only a small increase in parameter s  is necessary for WG to be equal to WS. As a
result, when b=0 the public and private firms want to merge for the values of parameter s such17
that 0.3557<s<0.4900 (zone I). When s³0.4900 only the public firm wants to merge (zone
IV), while when s£0.3557 only the private firm wants to merge (zone II).
Next we shall consider that b=0.2 (see table 1) to introduce the b-effect into the explanation
of the results. Given that parameter b is still small, the b-effect has a  small  weight  in  the
explanation of the results; they are explained by the s-effect. When b=0.2 it is obtained that
WS>WG  for  s>0.4065=sW(b=0.2)  and  (1-s)pS>     p1
G
  for  s<0.4973=sP(b=0.2).  Then,
sW(b=0.2) is still smaller than sP(b=0.2), but the difference between the two values is less than
when b=0. The reason is that when parameter b increases WS decreases more than WG, for a
given value of parameter s. As a result, parameter s must increase strongly in order for the
government to accept the merger. However, for a given value of parameter s, when parameter b
increases,      p1
G decreases more than (1-s)pS; therefore, the private firm will accept the merger
even with a small increase in parameter s. Then, when b=0.2 both the private and public firms
want to merge for the values  of  parameter  s  such  that  0.4065<s<0.4973  (zone  I).  When
s³0.4065 only the public firm wants to merge (zone IV) while when s£0.4973 only the private
firm wants to merge (zone II).
We have seen in the above cases that when the value of parameter b is low, the results are
due to the s-effect. However, when parameter b is high enough, the b-effect dominates the s-
effect. This is the case, for example, when b=0.6 (see table 2); the value of parameter b is now
so high that sW(b=0.6) is greater than sP(b=0.6). As parameter b is high enough, the value of
parameter s necessary for the public firm to want to merge is greater than that allowing the
private firm to want to merge. In this case, WG <  WS for s>0.5618 and      p1
G ³ (1-s)pS for
s³0.5396.  As  a  result,  neither  the  public  firm  nor  the  private  one  want  to  merge  for18
0.5396<s<0.5618 (zone III). When s³0.5618 only the public firm wants to merge (zone IV),
while when s£0.5396 only the private firm wants to merge (zone II).


















































Table 2. Values of the objective functions of the government and the private firm for k=2.
When we consider a value of parameter b greater than 0.6, for example b=0.9 (see table 2),
the b-effect becomes stronger. Thus, the interval of values of parameter s in which the public
firm and the private firm do not want to merge, 0.5688<s<0.6130 (zone III), is greater than
when we considered b=0.6. When s³0.6130 only the public firm wants to merge (zone IV),
while when s£0.5688 only the private firm wants to merge (zone II).
5. The decision to merge by firms when there are economies of scope
One advantage of multiproduct firms is that they are able to obtain economies of scope. The
term economies of scope (see Panzar and Willig, 1981) is used to describe a basic property of
production: cost saving which results from scope rather than scale. Chandler (1990, p. 41)
argues that “the most common stimulus to diversification was the potential for economies of
scope existing in an enterprise’s major functional units-production, distribution, and research.
At most enterprises the first step toward such product diversification was the development of a
full line that exploited the firm’s facilities and capabilities in all the three major activities”.19
When a private and a public firm merge, setting up a multiproduct firm, they are able to
obtain economies  of  scope.  An  example  is  given  by  the  partial  acquisition  of  Nissan  by
Renault.  They  will  implement  synergies  covering  the  whole  scope  of  their  activities,
particularly in the areas of purchasing, product strategy and research. They plan to develop a
common line of platforms  and powertrains. These synergies will also apply to  the  strong
complementary nature of their geographical locations. Renault Presse (20-10-99) points out that
“Work already done by the Cross  Company  Teams  confirms  the  transaction  rationale  and
feasibility of the objective of overall savings of $ 3.3 billion (3 billion euros) for the 2000-2002
period alone. In the longer term, these synergies would reach $ 3 billion each year from 2005
onwards”.
We can introduce economies of scope into our model by assuming that the cost function
of the multiproduct firm is:




2 – dq0q1, 0 < d < k.
We denote by sP(d) and sW(d) the values of parameter s such that the private firm and the
public firm, respectively, are indifferent to merging when there are economies of scope. The
values of sP(d) and sW(d) are set down in the appendix. The government prefers a multiproduct
firm to a mixed duopoly if s>sW(d) and the private firm wants to merge if s<sP(d). In order to
determine the equilibrium of the game we have to compare the values sP(d) and sW(d). Given
that this comparison is very complex, we shall compare sP(d) and sW(d) for k=2. It can be
shown that sW(d) strictly decreases with d for all b and that sP(d) strictly increases with d for all
b.20
Proposition 4. For k=2, the private firm and the public  firm  will  merge  if  and  only  if
sW(d)<s <sP(d), where sW(d)< sW and sP< sP(d).
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This proposition shows that when there are economies of scope the private firm and the
public one want to merge and set up a multiproduct firm only when sW(d)<s<sP(d). Thus, for a
given value of parameter k, the public firm and the private firm want to merge for a broader
range of values of parameters  b  and  s  than  when  there  are  no  economies  of  scope.  The
comparison of propositions 3 and 4 is shown in figure 5 for k=2, d=0 and d=0.2.
s
b 0
s   (d=0) W
s   (d=0) P
s   (d=0.2) W
s   (d=0.2) P
Merger between the private and public firms when d=0
Merger between the private and public firms when d=0.2
Figure 5. Illustration of proposition 4.
The reason of this result is that the existence of economies of scope implies that, for a
given output level, the production cost of the multiproduct firm is lower than that of the public
and private firms. As a result, the profit of the multiproduct firm increases with parameter d,
                                                
11 The result obtained in proposition 4 holds for values of parameter k other than 2.21
for  a  given  value  of  parameters  b  and  s,  implying  that  sP<sP(d);  i.  e.  the  existence  of
economies of scope implies that the shareholders of the private firm will accept the merger for a
lower percentage of the shares in the multiproduct firm. Similarly, for a given output level, WS
increases with parameter d, since the production cost of the multiproduct firm decreases with
this parameter. Therefore, sW(d)<sW; i. e. the existence of economies of scope implies that the
government will accept the merger for a lower percentage of the shares in the multiproduct
firm. Thus, economies of scope make the merger attractive for even lower values of s than
before: values that would not be conducive to mergers without the economies of scope (see
figure 5).
6. Conclusions
Literature on mergers has extensively analyzed the decision to merge by private firms but
it has not considered the decision to merge by private and public firms. The purpose of this
paper is to study this type of merger, which is an important issue because of the recent debates
concerning the privatization of public firms. These firms are usually acquired by private firms,
with multiproduct firms being set up after the acquisition. However, the literature on public
firms considers that when a public firm is privatized a new uniproduct private firm arises.
In this paper we assume that when a private firm and a public one merge, they set up a
multiproduct firm in which the government owns an exogenous percentage stake. We show
that the decision to merge by firms depends crucially on the percentage of shares owned by the
government in the multiproduct firm and on the degree to which goods are substitutes. When
the percentage of the shares owned by the government takes an intermediate value and  the
degree to which goods are substitutes is low enough, both the private firm and the public firm
will want to merge. When the percentage of the shares owned by the government takes an
intermediate value and the degree to which goods are substitutes is high enough, neither the
private nor the public firm will want to merge.22
Multiproduct  firms  are  usually  able  to  obtain  economies  of  scope.  If  we  introduce
economies of this type into the model we obtain that, for a given value of parameter k, the
public and the private firm want to merge for a broader range of values of parameters b and s
than when there are no economies of scope.
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Appendix
Let sP denote the value of s such that      (1 – s)pS = p1
G.
sP = (12 + 16b - 8b2 - 16b3 + 4b5 + (40 + 42b -14b2 - 18b3 - b4) k + (51 + 41b -9b2 - 5b3)
k2+ (31 + 18b -2b2) k3 + (9 + 3b) k4 + k5 - (2 - b2 + 3k + k2) (4b5 (2 + k) - 4b2 (1 + k) (2 +
k)2 - 2b3 (2 + k)2 (2 + 3k) + b4 (8 - k2) + (2 + 2k + k2) (2 + 3k + k2)2 + 2b (1 + k)2 (4 + 10k
+ 6k2 +k3))1/2) / ((1 + b) (4b4 - b3 (2 + k) + (1 + k)2 (14 + 15k + 4k2) - b2 (14 + 19k + 6k2)
+ b (2 + k - 2k2 - k3))).
Let sW denote the value of s such that WS=WG:
sW = (2 (3 + b - 4b2 + b4) + (13 + 8b - 10b2 - 2b3) k + (9 + 8b - 2b2) k2 +
2 (1 + b) k3 - (2 - b2 + 3k + k2) (2 (1 + k) (1 + k - b))1/2) /
((1 + b) (7 + 2b3 + 15k + 10k2 + 2k3 - 2b2 (1 + k) - 2b (3 + 4k + k2))).
When there are economies of scope the profit of the multiproduct firm and social welfare are:
   
pS= a2 ((1 – s) (1 + b) – d + k)2





2 ((3 – 2s) (1 + b) – d + k)
((2 – s) (1 + b) – d + k)
2 .
Let sW(d) denote, when there are economies of scope, the value of parameter s such that
WS=WG:24
sW(d)= -(6 - 2b5 - 13k - 9k2- 2k3 - 2b4 (d -1 + k) + 2b3 (4 + (6 - d)k + k2) +b (1 + k) (d - 8+
2k2 (d - 2) + k (6d - 13)) + d (7 + 15k + 10k2 + 2k3) - 2b2 (1 + k) (4d - 3 + k (d + 2)+ k2) +
(2 ((1 + b)2 (2 - b2+ 3k + k2)2 (2b3d - 2b2d  (1 + k) - b (1 + k) (1 + 2d(3 + k)) - (1 + k) (1 + k
+ d (7 + 8k + 2 k2)))))1/2) / ( (1 + b)2 (7 + 2b3 + 15k + 10k2+ 2k3- 2b2 (1 + k) - 2b(3 + 4k +
k2))).
Let sP(d) denote, when there are economies of scope, the value of parameter s such that
    (1 – s)pS = p1
G:
sP(d)= (12 + 4b5 + 40k + 51k2 + 31k3 + 9k4 + k5 + b3 (d - 8 - 5k) (2 + k) - d (1 + k)3 (2 + k)
-b4 (d + k) + b2 (2 + k) (d - 4 - 5k - 2k2) + b  (2 + 3k + k2) (8 + d (k - 1) + 9k + 3k2) - ((2 -
b2+ 3k + k2)2 (4b5 (2 + k) + 2b3 (2 + k) (d2 - 4 - 8k + 4d k - 3k2) + 2b (2 + 3k + k2) (2 +
d2(k - 1) + 6k + 5k2 + k3 - 2d k (2 + k)) + b4 (8 + d2 - k2 - 4d (3 + 2k)) + (1 + k)2 (2 + k) (4 +
6k + 4k2 + k3 + d2 (4 + k) - 2d (3 + 4k + k2)) - 2b2 (2 + k) (d2 (2 + 3k) + 2 (2 + 3k + k2) - d
(6 + 10k + 3k2))))1/2) / ((1 + b) (4b4 - b3 (2 + k) + (1 + k)2 (14 + 15k + 4k2) -b2 (14 + 19k +
6k2) + b (2 + k - 2k2 - k3))).25
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